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THE LAW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
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Just a year ago, on April 28, 1965, United States Marines entered 
the city of Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. 1 Such a sight was 
not unfamiliar to Latin Americans during the first quarter of this cent-
ury. In fact, the United States had occupied the Dominican Republic 
itself from 1916 until 1924. Nevertheless, the event marked an innova-
tion in recent American foreign policy, since the United States had not 
so intervened in Latin America for more than three decades, Further-
more, the action was in direct contravention of Article 15 of the Charter 
of the Organization of American States which provides: "No State or 
group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 
State." 
President Johnson explained this intervention as a matter of self-
defense -- at first for the frotection of American citizens then residing 
in the Dominican Republic and later for the national security. 3 Within 
a few days the President's rationale shifted as the immediate danger 
assumed the character of chaos, rather than a clear communist threat, 
* © , 1966, by the author, reproduced herein by permission. This 
paper was originally presented in connection with Professor Louis 
Sohn1 s Seminar on International Protection of Human Rights, 
** LL.B. 1965. 
1. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1965, p. 1, col. 8. 
2. "For two days American forces have been in Santo Domingo in an 
effort to protect the lives of Americans and nationals of other 
states in the face of increasing violence and disorder. 11 President 
Johnson, quoted inN. Y. Times, May 1, 1965, p. 6, col. 4. 
3. "The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the 
establishment of another Communist government in the Western 
Hemisphere. 11 President Johnson, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1965, 
p. 10, col. 4. 
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Thus, the United States began to justify its continued military presence 
as a stop-gap measure until the Organization of American States could 
effectively act. 4 The right to intervene became dependent upon the 
right of the Organization of American States to intervene. That organ-
ization did not regard its actions as measures of pure self-defense, 
however. In the debates before the Organization of American States, 
Mr. Facio, the delegate from Costa Rica, said: 
But do not forget the principle of humanitarianism, 
the principle of democratic representation, the princi-
ple of human rights. In the Dominican Republic, even 
the most elemental institutions have been destroyed. 
There is no government. The people are threatened 
with death, hunger and plague. The political groups 
have no control. We must act collectively to solve 
this Dominican tragedy. 5 
The resolution adopted with United States support by the Organization 
of American States was cast in terms of restoring peace rather than 
of preventing the establishment of a communist government. 6 
Thus, the United States and troops from several Latin American 
countries intervened in 1965 for reasons which do not seem very differ-
ent from those advanced in the late nineteenth century at the time of the 
Spanish-American war: 
4. "It is only the temporary presence of our forces in Santo Domingo 
which has made it possible for the Organization of American States 
to carry out its consultations, to organize its machinery and to 
take its proper place on the scene of the fighting in the Dominican 
Republic." Adlai Stevenson, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1965, p. 14, 
col. 4. 
"! based our legal right to act on the need to save lives and to 
preserve a situation for a period of time which would enable the 
Organization of American States to act collectively." Under-
Secretary of State Thomas Mann, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1965, 
Section 4, p. E3, col. 4. 
5. Time, May 14, 1965, p. 33. 
6. "This force will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic 
impartiality, that of cooperating in the restoration of normal cond-
itions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its 
inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights and in the establish-
ment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the 
functioning of democratic institutions." Organization of American 
States Resolution, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1965, p. 14, col. 6. 
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The forcible intervention of the United States as 
a neutral to stop the war, according to the large 
dictates of hUinanity and following many historical 
precedents where neighboring states have interfered 
to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by inter-
necine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable 
on rational grounds. • •• In the cause of hUinanity 
and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, 
starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, 
and which the parties to the conflict are either unable 
or unwilling to stop or mitigate. 7 
VOL. 7 
The situation which the American President faced in 1965 was, of 
course, considerably different from that faced by his predecessor at 
the turn of the century. Two major differences are the existence of 
the Organization of American States and the existence of an effective 
Communist movement threatening established government in Latin 
America. Nevertheless, there are elements in common which make 
a study of past intervention relevant to the present decision-making 
process. 
The first major American military intervention designed to stem 
political chaos in Latin America was in Cuba in 1898. That action 
had been conditioned by a long line of legal and political thought con-
cerning hUinanitarian intervention. This article discusses the theory 
of humanitarian intervention and explores the problems in its applica-
tion which American intervention in the Caribbean reveals. 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1. State Practice: 
There have been nUinerous occasions when one country has acted 
directly to influence events occuring wholly within another country. 8 
At least two military interventions were carried out by single powers 
·in the name of humanitarian intervention: the United States intervened 
in Cuba in 1898;9 and Russia intervened in Turkey on behalf of Bulgarian 
nationalists in 1877 after two years of protest by other European powers 
7. President McKinley, [ 1898] Foreign Rel. 757 ( 190 1). 
8. Rou_9.ier, La Th~orie de !'Intervention d 1HUinanit{.' 17 Revue 
Ge'nerale de Droit Iriternat10nal Pubhc 468 ( 19 Io ); Stowell, 
Intervention in International Law ( 19 21). 
9. See p. 3 03 infra. 
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had proven fruitless. 10 In addition to these examples of unilateral 
intervention, there have also been instances of collective intervention. 11 
During the nineteenth century the "Great Powers of Europe" deter-
mined state practice in the Western world. Thus, the intervention 
in 1827 of the great powers of Europe on behalf of Greek freedom 
showed state practice supporting the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention. 12 Similarly, the intervention of France in Syria in 1860 
was the result of agreement among the European powers. 13 The 
intervention of the great powers of Europe and Japan in China in 1900 
to compel the Emperor of China to ~uell the "Boxer" sect has also 
been mentioned in this connection. 1 
2. Legal Theoreticians: 
Where state practice is an imperfect guide, it is proper to turn 
to scholars of international law. 
A number of writers from the time of Grotius to the present have 
clearly recognized the right of humanitarian intervention. 
Intervention in the internal affairs of another state is 
justifiable in two classes of cases ••.• The second is 
when a country has fallen into such a condition of an-
archy or misrule as unavoidably to disturb the peace, 
external or internal, of its neighbors, whatever the 
conduct or policy of its government may be in that 
respect. l5 
Other formulations of the right of humanitarian intervention differ 
from this somewhat. 16 Nevertheless, these formulations apparently 
10. Rougier, supra note 8, at 474-475; Stowell, op. cit. supra note 
8, at 127-136. 
11. A multitude of other occasions of intervention which did not reach 
the stage of military action further illustrates the existence of 
international concern in the internal affiars of a single nation. See 
Rougier, supra note 8; Stowell, op. cit. supra note 8. 
12. Rougier, supra note 8, at 473; Stowell, op. cit. supra note 8, at 
126-127. 
13. Rougier, supr_a note 8, at 473-474; Stowell, op. cit. supra note 
8, at 63-66. 
14. Rougier, supra note 8, at 470. 
15. 1 Westlake, International Law 318-319 (2d ed. 1910). 
16. Hodges, The Doctrine of Intervention 53-54 ( 1915); Grotius, 
The Law of War and Peace, Bk. II, Ch. XX, Sec. VIII, at 504 
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agree on two points. First, in extreme cases there is a right to inter-
vene in the conduct of a sovereign towards his subjects. Second, this 
right is determined not by an invariable, objective rule, but by the 
subjective standards of the world community (public scandal, shock 
according to the sense of mankind, outrage to recognized principles 
of decency and humanity, barbarity of measures, or misrule disturb-
ing to the peace of neighboring states). Thus, the fundamental human 
rights involved are subject to modification according to mankind's 
increasing sensitivity toward the individual and human rights. 
Such concepts do not go unchallenged. At least one writer has 
denied that internal acts in one nation affect other nations: 
Neighboring nations talk of the smoke of corpses rising 
to their nostrils; if their sense of smell is so sensitive, 
why aren't they trying to overcome the stink with the 
perfume of their own actions? They say that the stench 
corrupts the atmosphere, but there is a very simple way 
to avoid it, i.e., establish a quarantine and break off all 
relations with the nation that violates the laws of humanity. 
Instead of peaceful means, neighboring nations speak of 
shooting; but guns do not have, unless I am very much 
mistaken, the gift of diminishing the number of corpses 
or of disinfecting the atmosphere corrupted by their smoke. 17 
Yet force can halt atrocities which might otherwise continue unchecked, 
Some scholars have, nevertheless, disputed the legal basis for 
military intervention. Theoretically, they argue, each state is independ-
ent and sovereign, and as such recognizes itself as the highest law. It 
is bound by treaties only because it has made them binding upon itself. 18 
A variation on this theme is the theory that intervention is proper only 
in what are deemed less than "civilized" states. 19 These writers also 
argue that the "Law of nations" is merely a law between sovereign states 
and does not directly concern individuals. 20 "International law professes 
(1646 ed. Kelsey trans!, The Classics of International Law No. 3, 
1925); Rougier, supra note 8, at 517 -523; Stowell, op. cit. 
sup;ra note 8, at 51-52; Wright, The Bombardmeiirof"'Diimascus 
20 Am. J. Int'l L. 263, 269 ( 1926); Thomas & Thomas, Non-Inter-
vention 378 (1956). 
17. Tanoviceano, Droit International de !'Intervention 12-13 ( 1884). 
18. See von Floeckher, De !'Intervention en Droit International 18-19 
(1896). 
19. See Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law 262-263 
( 1920). 
20. 1 Oppenheim, International Law, Sec. 292, at 368 (Zd ed. 1912). 
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to bf! concerned only with the relations of states to each other. 
Tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects, massacres 
and brutality in a civil war, or religious persecution, are acts which 
have nothing to do directly or indirectly with such relations. "21 
But these objections assume the very thing which is disputed. 
Even if a state owes no duty to its subjects, it may owe other states 
a duty to grant these same subjects rights under municipal law. 
Under the minority system of the League of Nations some countries 
were made responsible to the League for the proper treatment of 
minorities within their borders. Other examples are found in Article 
55 of the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declar-
ation of Human Rights. 22 Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights the individual in signatory states has a right to petition for 
redress against his own government to an international court. Thus, 
it is possible for international law to be concerned with the relation-
ships between people within a single state. Indeed, the instances 
which have been recited, the practice of intervention, and the opinions 
of writers previously mentioned all indicate that international law is 
concerned with such relationships. 
Inaction by the world community in the face of the obvious abuse 
of human rights has been taken to show state practice supporting the 
theoretical lack of any international guarantee of such rights. 23 
Lack of accurate information has been partially responsible for this, 
but a second concern is the power of the violating nation. A nation 
must weigh the effect of the violation of the laws of humanity on its 
conscience against the impact which armed struggle would have 
upon its population. This might be ignoble, but it does not make a 
nullity of the doctrine. 
One practical objection to humanitarian intervention is the 
potentiality of its being abused. In an imperfect world decision-
making humans can never be absolutely certain that they are on the 
side which has the predominance of truth, justice, and morality. 
Thus, precipitate action might set a bad precedent,which others 
might follow. 24 One example of such abuse is the German invasion 
of Czechoslovakia under a claim of intervention on behalf of the 
persecuted racial German minority. 25 Thus, the doctrine can serve 
21. Hall, International Law 342 (8th ed. Higgins, 1924). 
22. General AssemblY; Resolution 217A, Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 3d 
Sess., 1st pt., Resolutions, at 71-77(A/.810) (1948). 
23. 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 20, Sec. 292 at 369. 
24. See Bernard, On the Principle of Non-Intervention ( 1860). 
25. Thomas & Thomas, op. cit. supra note 16, at 374. 
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to mask the true designs of aggressors. 26 For this reason, at least 
one writer would make non-intervention the legal rule. 11 The ordin-
ary rule is good for ordinary cases, which, after all, make up at 
least ninety-nine hundredths of life. To say that it is no rule because 
it may laudably be ignored once or twice in a generation, is to over-
turn order in an attempt to exalt virtue. 11 27 
On the other hand, it may be unwise to refuse a theory legitimacy 
simply because it has been abused. It may be contended that forcible 
intervention is itself "wrong" because it creates a breach of inter-
national peace. However, contempt for human rights is perhaps a 
greater threat to peace than attempts to assert through intervention 
the sanctity of human personality. Unless the right of intervention is. 
asserted, the persecution will continue unchecked, 28 Thus, the value 
of preventing further outrage may outweigh the harm done by inter-
vention. 
Finally, even those vociferous opponents of the legality of human-
itarian intervention referred to above admit its moral justification. 29 
For example, one such writer stated: 
The law upholds as a principle the sovereignty and 
equality of States from the greatest to the least, and, 
as a corollary, prohibits intervention. Here, again, 
in a hundred particular cases, there may be the most 
powerful inducements to shake off the restraints of 
the rule. Nay, there may even be cases in which it 
becomes a positive duty to transgress it --in which 
respect it does but resemble every other merely 
human law. 30 
The latest edition of Oppenheim's International Law recognizes the 
propriety of collective intervention. "The notion and the prohibition 
of intervention cannot accurately extend to collective action under-
taken in the general interest of States or for the collective enforce-
ment of International Law. 11 31 
26. See Hall, op. cit. supra note 21, at 344. 
27. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law 129 (6th ed. 1915). 
28. See Thomas & Thomas, op. cit. supra note 15, at 374; H. Lauter-
pacht, International Law and Human Rights 3 2 ( 19 50). 
29. Lawrence, op. cit. supra note 27, at 129; von Floeckher, op. cit. 
supra note Tif," at16; Hall, op. cit. supra. note 21, at 344-.-
30. Bernard, op. cit, supra note 24, at 33-34. 
31. 1 Oppenheim, International Law Sec. 140a at 319 (8th ed. Lauter-
pacht 1955). 
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Thus, there is virtual unanimity among writers on international 
law t,!at some form of humanitarian intervention is either legally or 
ethically proper. It would indeed be wrong to unnecessarily brand 
conduct unlawful which is morally justified. The result would be to 
restrain legally-minded nations from acting despite an overwhelming 
need for action. The delay of the democracies in joining battle with 
Hitler's Germany has shown what a tragic mistake this can be. 
Therefore, since a particular intervention on behalf of humanity may 
be regarded with favor by virtually all those concerned with the 
advancement of international law, humanitarian intervention is law-
ful under general international law as an exception to the general 
rule of non-intervention. Instead of labeling the exception as un-
lawful, the best procedure would be to identify the problems its 
application involved and then establish safeguards to protect against 
them. 
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS: 
THE EXAMPLE OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 
1. Problem of Perception: 
While humanitarian intervention in some form may be lawful, 
there are grave practical problems in its application, which an analy-
sis of the United States intervention in Cuba in 1898 reveals. 
The first problem is one of perception. At the time of the inter-
vention in Cuba there were essentially three crucial parties --the 
American public, the United States government, and the Spanish 
government. American public opinion was based on newspaper 
reports; the decisions of the governments of Spain and the United 
States were based on reports from their representatives on the 
island. 
Sensational journalism was the primary source of information 
for most Americans; in fact, the reading public thrived on excite-
ment. It is not surprising, therefore, that "newspapers reported 
that some four or five hundred thousand people -- a quarter of the 
population --were dead, and the remainder diseased and starving. 11 32 
One story has it that Frederic Remington told William Randolph 
Hearst he could not do battle sketches because there was no war, 
to which Hearst replied: "You furnish the pictures; I'll furnish the 
war. "33 
32. Friedel, The Splendid Little War 4 (1958). 
33. Morgan, William McKinley and His America 330 ( 1963). 
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A major source of information for the newspapers was the Cuban 
Junta, a group of Cuban exiles and simpathizers whose purpose was 
to propagandize for the rebel cause. 4 In December 1896 the New 
York Journal cited many items of Spanish atrocity; all were intlle 
form of letters or statements from "recently arrived" Cuban emigrants 
and generally emanated from the Junta. 35 
Richard Harding Davis, a Hearst correspondent, bore witness to 
the insubstantiality of many of these tales: 
I had been kept sufficiently long in Key West to learn 
how large a proportion of Cuban war news is manu-
factured on the piazzas of the hotels of that town and 
of Tampa by utterly irresponsible newspaper men who 
accept every rumor that finds its way across the gulf, 
and pass these rumors on to some of the New York 
papers as facts coming directly from the field. 36 
However, after travelling throughout the island and talking with the 
people there, Davis sent this report: "Speaking dispassionately, and 
with the knowledge of the details of many butcheries, it is iinpossible 
for me to think of the Spanish guerrillas otherwise than as worse than 
savage animals. , .• These guerrillas murder and then laugh over it. 
These men kill to feed their vanity ... 37 
But the press did not confine its outcry to charges of random 
atrocities. The greatest clamor was directed at the policy of re-
concentration instituted by General Valeriano Weyler. Davis wrote: 
Thousands of human beings are now herded together 
around the seaport towns of <;uba who cannot be fed, 
who have no knowledge of cleanliness or sanitation, 
who have no doctors to care for them and who cannot 
care for themselves. 
Many of them are dying of sickness and some of 
starvation, and this is the healthy season. 38 
Davis also reported that Wey1er 1s policies did not even advance the 
Spanish cause. He claimed that the rural population joined the 
34. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 331. 
35. Wisan, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press 
(1895 -1898) 66 (1934), 
36. Davis, Cuba in War Time 103 (1897), 
37. Id. atll2. 
38. Id. at 54-55. 
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insurgents rather than let themselves be herded into the cities. Those 
who were forced into the towns --women, children, the aged, the in-
firm -- became an added burden to the Spanish residents there. The 
devastation of the countryside did not succeed in hampering the insur-
gents since the rebels were accustomed to sleeping outdoors and forag-
ing for themselves. 39 "So the order failed to distress those against 
whom it was aimed, but brought swift and terrible suffering to those 
who were and are absolutely innocent of any intent against the govern-
ment, as well as to the adherents of the government. n40 At least one 
writer found in the reported treatment of the civilian population by the 
Spanish so severe a violation of the rules of civilized warfare that 
intervention was authorized. 41 
The resulting outcry of the American public led the President to 
protect Spanish conduct by means of a diplomatic note. Secretary of 
State Sherman sent a message to the Spanish Ambassador to the United 
States, Depuy de Lome, which said in part, "He [the President] is 
bound by the higher obligations of his representative office to protest 
against the uncivilized and inhumane conduct of the campaign in the 
island of Cuba. u42 
The United States depended on its representa~ives for information. 
The Consul-General in Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, held views which coin-
cided in large measure with those held by Davis. Both men believed 
that the war would continue until Spain was financially exhausted or 
until another power intervened and that meanwhile Cuban agriculture 
would be destroyed causing enormous loss of life and property. 
Although Davis and Lee disagreed on Spanish intentions to institute 
reforms, they did agree that n.p!hing approximating autonomy could 
actually be instituted in Cuba. 
The Consul in Matanzas, Mr. Brice, reported: 
Over 2, 000 (I have the list of names) have died in this 
city -- want of food -- since January 1 up to October 1, 
1897 •••. Local authorities are powerless and unable 
to cope with the situation. Cities and towns are bankrupt 
39. Davis, op. cit. supra note 36, at 42-43. 
40. Id. at 43. 
41. Woolsey, America's Foreign Policy 63-64 (1898). 
42. Sherman to de Lome, June 26, 1897. Spanish Diplomatic Corres-
pondence and Documents 26 (1905) [hereinafter cited as Sp. Corr.]. 
43. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 341. Davis, op. cit. supra 
note 36, at3T,l34-43. 
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and can give little or no relief to the starving 
thousands. . .• Allow these people to go out into 
the country and plant crops, and in less than sixty 
days all will be well and starvation a thing of the 
past. 44 
VOL. 7 
Another set of reports encouraged restraint, however. United 
States Ambassador Woodford in Spain urged that diplomacy could 
accomplish all of the ends of military intervention. As late as April 
of 1898 he wrote McKinley, "1 believe you will get final settlement 
before August 1 on one of the following bases: Either such autonomy 
as the insurgents may agree to accept, or recognition by Spain of the 
independence of the island, or cession of the island to the United 
States. rr45 
In late 1897 the Spanish government recalled General Weyler and 
sent General Blanco to Cuba. Blanco proclaimed autonomy and issued 
edicts against reconcentration, but the giving of the orders did not in 
its e 1 f insure their accomplishment. On January 8, 1898, Lee 
reported that reconcentration s~emed as flagrant as ever despite the 
new edicts against the policy. 4 
The belief that Spanish promises did not guarantee results was 
strengthened by the riots which broke out in Havana on January 12, 
1898. Lee telegraphed the next day: 11 After a day and night of excite-
ment, all business suspended, and rioting, everything quiet at this 
hour. • •• Mobs shouted yesterday, 1Death to Blanco and death to 
autonomy, 1 while 1Viva Weyler 1 was frequently heard.rr47 The result 
of the riots was a widespread conviction in the United States, shared 
by the President, that autonomy had failed. 48 
Thus, a basic lack of confidence in Spain• s ability --whatever her 
intentions -- to fulfill her promises caused the President to embrace 
the views of Lee and Brice and to reject those of Ambassador Woodford. 
On April 1, 1898, the President told Congress: 
The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain 
has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of 
44. Report of Mr. Brice to Mr. Day, October 15, 1897. [ 1898] 
ForeignRel. 596, 597(1901). 
45. Mr. Woodford to President McKinley, April 10, 1898. [ 1898] 
Foreign Rel. 747 (1901). 
46. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 352. 
47. Mr. F. Lee to Mr. Day, January 13, 1898. [ 1898] Foreign 
Rel. 1025 (1901). 
48. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish 
American War 107 ( 1908). 
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insurrection may flame or may smolder with vary-
ing seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that 
it cannot be extinguished by present methods. The 
only hope of relief and repose from a condition 
which can no longer be endured is the enforced 
pacification of Cuba. 49 
307 
Spain did not deny that the war was causing immense suffering. 
General Blanco wrote the Prime Minister of Spain: 
The army, exhausted and anemic, filling the hospitals, 
without the force to fight or hardly even to hold up its 
weapons; more than three hundred thousand concen-
trados dying or starving, perishing from hunger and 
misery around the cities; the people of the countryside 
terrified, prey to genuine horror, forced to abandon 
their farms or lands, suffering under the most hideous 
tyranny, with no recourse to escape their terrible 
situation except to go strengthen the rebel ranks. 50 
Nevertheless, the Spanish government disagreed with the United 
States government in assessing blame for this situation. The Spanish 
felt that the rebels had no justification for starting the conflict. 
Their position was adopted by the American journalist, George Rea: 
"I lived in Cuba for five years previous to the insurrection, and spent 
the best part of my time in the country, and I must say that if the 
Cubans were oppressed, I failed to discover in what manner; for in 
no other country is liberty of action more enjoyed than in Cuba. ,5! 
Furthermore, Spain insisted that it had been the destruction of agri-
culture by the rebels not the reconcentration order, which had first 
caused the people of the countryside to flock to the cities and towns 
of the island. The order itself was merely a practical political 
measure to isolate the rebels so that they could be identified and 
captured, 52 and similar measures had in fact been taken by th~ 
United States in the past. 53 
49. (1898] Foreign Rel. 759 (1901). 
50. May, Imperial Democracy; The Emergence of America as a Great 
Power 163 (1961). 
51. Rea, Facts and Fakes About Cuba 37 ( 1897). 
52. Duke of Tetuan to de Lome, August 4, 1897. Sp. Corr. 32~ Rea, 
op. cit. supra note 51, at 90-97. 
53. Benton, op. cit. supra note 48, at 107. Fuller, Spanish Treaty 
Claims Comii11ss10n: Report 1901-1907 23 (1907); See note l 
accompanying opinion of Commissioner Chandler at 2 71-282. 
Compare treatment of Indians by the United States, and devastation 
of the South in the Civil War. Sp. Corr. 28-35. Compare also the 
strategic hamlet system employed on United States advice in South 
Vietnam. 
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Unlike the United States government, the Spanish felt the war 
would soon end in the absence of outside interference. 
The year 1898 opened with the formation of the insular 
government of Cuba. It was not long before its bene-
ficial effects made themselves felt as anticipated. 
Many rich men who had voluntarily emigrated from 
Cuba returned to their homes; discord and doubt began 
to appear in the insurgent ranks; irr:portant adhesions 
took place; and so much confusion was produced in the 
rebel armies that it became necessary for their chiefs 
to impose exemplary and severe punishments and 
threaten with the penalty of death those who attempted 
to give in their adhesion. 54 
Spain believed that the prolongation of the war was due to the 
encouragement received by the rebels from the United States: 11 The 
reserve with which the new autonomous constitution was received 
shows that there was a preconceived plan to render it nugatory and 
cause it to break down in order to realize the covetous and traditional 
ambition of North America. n55 
The Spanish government was willing to rescind its policy of 
reconcentration, to help resettle the Cuban population, to suspend 
hostilities, and to grant a limited amount of autonomy; but it would 
not consider granting independence. "The Spanish government and 
the whole people of Spain maintain their absolute sovereignty over 
the Spanish Antilles, which were discovered, peopled, civilized, 
and enriched by the legitimate descendants of those who opened UP. 
the American continent to the light of progress and Christianity. 11 56 
If the United States had made it clear that it would not intervene 
in Cuba for any cause at any time, there might have been endless 
internecine warfare. On the other hand, if the insurgents had cap-
itulated, there would have been no legitimate justification for United 
States intervention. 57 Since action was taken, the result of inaction 
is a matter of speculation. 
54. Gullon to ambassadors abroad. Sp. Corr. 128. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Id. at 131. 
57. Intervention to help a colony free itself from a colonial power 
may be permissable today. Cf. United Nations Resolutions on 
Colonialism, e.g:, Gen. AsS':'"""Resolutlon 1514 (XV) of Decem-
ber 14, 1960: United Nations support of Indonesia m freemg 
itself from the Netherlands; Sohn, The Role of the United Nations 
in Civil Wars, 57 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proceedings 208, 209 ( 1963). 
Nevertheless, in 1898 such a right was not generally recognized. 
Stowell, op. cit. supra note 8, at 345-49. 
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The recent intervention in the Dominican Republic provides a 
striking parallel to our conduct in the Spanish-American War as 
regards the problems of perception. The views of Dominican ex-
President Juan Bosch c·oincided with those of a large segment of, 
for example, the French press, which felt that the rebel movement 
was in no danger of a communist takeover, and that without United 
States intervention the rEbels would quickly have won a revolutionary 
victory for the democratic left. 58 Senator William Fulbright, the 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, held the 
following viewpoint: 
The United States intervened forcibly in the Dominican 
Republic in the last week of April 1965 not primarily 
to save American lives, as was then contended, but to 
prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement which 
was judged to be Communist-dominated. • . . This was 
based on fragmentary and inadequate evidence. . .• The 
evidence suggests a chaotic situation in which no single 
faction was dominant at the outset and in which every-
body, including the United States, had opportunities to 
influence the shape and course of the rebellion. 59 
On the other hand, Fulbright's colleagues on the Committee had 
a very different understanding of the situation. Senator Long asserted, 
11 We had enough information to know that the Dominican revolt was a 
move in the direction of communism. n60 Senator Smathers said: 
The country was on fire; people were dying; property 
was being destroyed; Communists were on hand and 
chaos was in charge. • .• The overwhelming consensus 
of advisors was of the belief that we had better send in 
enough forces to make certain that the indiscriminate 
shooting and looting would be stopped, and that the 
Communists would not take over .••• At that time we 
thought that some 1, 560 people were killed in the first 
few days ••.• It may be that there were not 1, 560 
people killed. However, many of them were killed, 
and millions of dollars worth of property was destroyed. 61 
Although we may speculate as to the accuracy of these varying 
views of the situation in the Dominican Republic, the fact of inter-
vention prevents our discovering the extent of Communist influence 
and human suffering which would have existed if the United States 
had followed a policy of non-intervention. 
58. Time, May 7, 1965, p. 32; L'Express, May 31-June 6, 1965, 
p. 32-33. 
59. 111 Gong. Rec. 23002, 23003 (1965). 
60. Id. at 23007. 
61. Id. at 23006, 23007. 
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2. Problem of Who Should Intervene: 
A second problem revealed by analysis of the Spanish-American 
War is, simply, who should intervene. Acquiescence in intervention 
may be taken as an acknowledgement of the propriety of humanitarian 
intervention, but the Cuban experience indicates that this is not 
always true. Passive acceptance by other nations of one country's 
assertion of right does not necessarily establish it as an accepted 
legal principle. The legal significance of inaction by other nations 
in any instance of intervention requires a study of the worldwide 
political situation at that time. 
McKinley had known long before his intervention in Cuba that the 
European powers would pose no serious threat to his plan. Ambassador 
Woodford had sounded the depth of opinion among the continental powers 
and reached the conclusion that despite their pro-Spanish inclination, 
the continental powers would not risk war for the sake of Spain. 62 
Both Germany and Russia feared the potential loss in trade and 
investment with the United States which war with her might cause. 
Even more than this, they feared that other European states might 
take political advantage of such a war --watching them dissipate their 
strength across the ocean and then attacking them. 63 Thus, these 
nations demanded that all Europe unite behind Spain before they would 
support her. 
France feared a political and economic combination of America 
and England against her interests in the Far East. Thus she demanded 
that England be brought into the European combination before likewise 
joining her forces behind Spain. 64 
England, alone among European states, supported the United States. 
The ties of language, culture and similarity of interest in the Far East 
led the British to ignore past international political differences such as 
the War of 1812 and the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute. Prime Minister 
Balfour made it clear to Secretary of State Hay on April 6, 1898, that 
"neither here nor in Washington did the British Government propose to 
62. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 343: Letter from Woodford to 
Sherman,l:ieilrils, Adventures in American Diplomacy 1896-1906 
67 ( 1928). 
63. Letter from Chancellor von Bulow to Prince Eulenberg, May, 
op. cit. supra note 50, at 198. Report of the French Ambassador 
on tarl<s w1th the Russian Foreign Minister, May, supra, at Zl0-11. 
Letter from Ambassador Hay to Senator Henry Caoot Lodge, Dennis, 
op. cit. supra note 62, at 98. 
64. May, op. cit. supra note 50, at 207. 
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take any steps which would not be acceptable to the Government of the 
United States. u65 Thus the chain of causes which might have prevented 
United States intervention in Cuba was broken. 
When the rest of the world refuses to take action, the decision is 
left to the individual nation which must proceed on the basis of subject-
ive criteria. As a result, some atrocities go unpunished by humanitarian 
intervention while other atrocities are committed in the name of human-
itarian intervention. Where the decision to intervene falls to a single 
state, it should be safeguarded by a requirement that the state be totally 
disinterested. 
The United States, in fact, claimed to be a disinterested state in 
the Spanish-American conflict. 66 It pointed to its humanitarian concern 
and an express Congressional disclaimer of any int~ntion to exercise 
any power of control over Cuba other. than to resolve the immediate 
dispute. But America's claim to disinterestedness was controverted. 67 
Public opinion was indeed largely based on humanitarian feeling, but a 
great many other motives have been suggested: 
For one thing, it is clear that various groups saw war 
with Spain over Cuba as a means to solve other problems. 
Many agrarians viewed it as a way to monetize silver at 
home and thus pave the way for a general expansion of 
their exports to the sterling areas of the world. Some 
labor groups thought it would ease or resolve immediate 
economic difficulties. And many important businessmen, 
as contrasted with the editors of busmess publications, 
came to support war for specific commercial purposes 
as well as for general economic reasons. 68 
Indeed, it is frequently claimed that business interests had a signif-
icant part in urging the United States to war. 69 The war sentiment of 
"dollar diplomacy" is commonly assumed to have been prevalent at this 
time. Many scholars of this period, however, would now disagree with 
this assumption. 
65. Dennis, op. cit. supra note 62, at 72. 
66. Stowell, op. cit. supra note 8, at 121 n. 53; Straus, Humanitarian 
Diplomacyo:fthe Umted States, 6 Am. Soc. Int11 L. Proceedmgs 
45, S0-51 (1912); Draper, The Rescue of Cuba 52 (1899). 
67. See Rougier, supra note 8, at 503. 
68. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 32 (1959). 
69. Id. at 32-34. 
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Actually, businessmen, far from perpetrating the 
war, were, except for a few who made a living off 
Cuban investment and trade, generally more reluct-
ant than most citizens to disturb the ordinary pattern 
of peace and commerce; They were largely opposed 
or indifferent to the selfish, material aspects of the 
enterprise until the acquisition of the Philippines 
raised great hopes for new markets. 70 
VOL, 7 
President McKinley was impressed by the humanitarian call to 
rescue Cuba from utter annihilation, 71 but he relied heavily on the 
support of leading businessmen who were at first opposed to risking 
war. 72 In time, however, the business community ceased to oppose 
the pressure of public opinion for intervention. The Cuban situation 
had caused such a disequilibrium in the United States that the risks 
of armed intervention seemed minor compared to the advantage of 
bringing peace to Cuba. Unless the businessmen had supported 
intervention, they would have been prone to public condemnation as 
cowardly, mercenary and inhumane. Since it was now clear that the 
European powers would not support Spain, it probably seemed safe 
to businessmen to follow the lead of public opinion and support 
McKinley in whatever he chose to do. 
There was, in addition, another factor acting on both the business 
community and the President; namely, the small but vocal group of 
expansionists whose arguments helped the business communit7 per-
ceive the economic advantages of conquest in the Philippines. 3 
Sea power, new markets, new investment opportun-
ities, protection of trade routes, territorial expan-
sion -- all these were bound up with a genuine 
missionary zeal, but as far as Mahan, Roosevelt, 
Lodge and Albert J. Beveridge were concerned, they 
were probably sufficient reasons in themselves for 
meeting the moribund Spanish Empire in battle. 74 
Ambassador Woodford stated that the war began as a result of 
popular indignation at particular incidents -- a letter critical of 
McKinley by the Spanish Ambassador; the explosion of the battleship 
70. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations 
44 (1953), See May, op. cit. supra note 50, at 90. 
71. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 335. 
72. May, op. cit. supra note 50, at 118. 
73. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 332. 
74. Osgood, op. cit. supra note 71, at 45. 
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Maine; and, in light of widespread anti-Catholicism in the United 
States, the suggestion of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs that 
the request of the Pope for an armistice was at the instance of 
McKinley. 75 But these incidents would not have caused war unless 
the public had been awaiting it. 76 
McKinley1 s intervention message to Congress enumerated 
several motives for intervention in addition to the humanitarian 
one -- among them were the protection of American lives and prop-
erty in Cuba, the prevention of injury to the commerce of the United 
States, and the necessity of keeping the Cuban situation from becom-
ing a threat to the security of the United States. 77 
American intervention, then, was based on varied motives. It 
may be that humanitarian concern was primary. Once in the war, 
however, more hidden motives emerged, to be reflected in the 
results of the experience. 
Americans began the war not out of a realistic cal-
culation of national advantage but largely as an ideal-
istic crusade to free the Cubans from Spain1 s imperial 
shackles. Yet they ended it with a far-flung empire 
of their own from the Philippines to Hawaii to Puerto 
Rico. They undertook the war as a local action, but 
their victory affected the relations among all the great 
powers of the world, 78 
The results of the Spanish-American War demonstrate how 
hidden, selfish motives may be mingled with publicized altruistic 
ones and ultimately come to predominate. For this reason, it is 
necessary to determine whether an interested party may properly 
intervene at all. The authorities disagree sharply. 79 
Governments are not usually willing to sacrifice the lives of 
their own people where no compensation is involved. Even when they 
are shocked by the actions of another government, and would approve 
of measures to stop it, no single government is willing to expend the 
money and manpower necessary for action. 
75, Benton, op. cit. supra note 48, at 88 n. 11. 
76. Moore, The Principles of American Diplomacy 208 ( 1918). 
77. [ 1898] Foreign Rel. 75 7 ( 1901 ). 
78. Osgood, op. cit. supra note 71, at 42. 
79. Stowell, op. cit. supra note 8, at 62-64 n. 14: Benton, op. cit. 
supra note4B,at 104. 
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Analysis of the Spanish-American War does not solve the problem, 
First, we cannot know how a failure to intervene would have resulted. 
Second, the results of the intervention were ambiguous. Death and 
disease on the island were reduced sharply, and Cuba eventually 
received its independence. On the other hand, the Platt Amendment, 
adopted in the wake of the war, led to United States intervention in the 
internal politics of Cuba and a history of resentment against United 
States economic and political control, culminating in today 1s phenom-
enon of Fidel Castro. 
In the Dominican Republic, peace of some sort has also been 
, achieved; but we do not yet know at what price to the future of our 
relations with the countries of Latin America and to our own sense of 
propriety in future actions. In the Dominican Republic itself there 
have been riots recently which apparently manifest a rampant anti-
American feeling. 80 Although one might point to the action of the 
Organization of American States as showing a consensus among the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere on the propriety of the action, it 
is equally sound to argue that the Organization of American States 
acted only because the United States intervention caused what would 
have been a successful revolution to degenerate into a stalemated 
bloodbath. 
Conclusion 
It would appear that the problems revealed by this study are just 
those considerations which the peace-keeping machinery of the Organ-
ization of American States and the United Nations was designed to 
meet. If a right to intervene is based on the existence of a particular 
situation, the situation should exist in reality and not just in the eyes 
of one intervening power. However, the inaccessability of absolute 
truth should not bar action. Intervention on behalf of humanity may be 
necessary even though there is no guarantee that it is based on wholly 
accurate views of the situation. Knowledge of the problems involved 
provides a warning to establish safeguards in order to approach as 
closely as possible the right action. 
All sides must be heard and the evidence gathered as accurately 
and exhaustively as possible in the time available. If a very high 
proportion of nations fails to agree on the same interpretation of the 
evidence, no action should be taken. These safeguards are found in 
the peace-keeping-machinery of both the United Nations and the 
Organization of American States. Therefore, intervention by a single 
state should be based on the collective findings of these organizations 
and not merely on its own intelligence reports. 
The cessation of protracted internecine warfare resulting from 
intervention in Cuba in 1898 and the Dominican Republic in 1965 
80. N. Y. Times, February 9, 1966, p. 1, col. 6. 
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underscore the need for a power of intervention. When inaction on the 
part of all other nations makes it necessary, an interested nation 
should be permitted to intervene. Detrimental results of those inter-
ventions indicate, on the other hand, that such action must have inter-
national approval. 
In the Spanish-American War the nations of continental Europe 
supported Spain in principle, although they were unwilling to support 
their belief with force. Therefore, the unilateral intervention of the 
United States was unlawful. In the Dominican Republic intervention of 
1965 the United States acted before world opinion had been expressed. 
Although the dangers of delay may require action to be taken before the 
evidence of the grounds for action is conclusive, principles of inter-
nationallaw require a consensus of nations that the evidence of danger 
is sufficiently persuasive to warrant intervention. Ex post facto 
approval provides no safeguard to the dangers of hasty action by an 
interested party. Therefore, once again, the United States has acted 
wrongly. 
